Escrow as an Internal Ledger, Not Held Cash
Because Balinyaar cannot custody buyer funds (§2.2), "escrow" must be a software construct: a double-entry ledger STATE over money that legally sits at a licensed provider/bank. The original ~45-table model had no ledger — escrow was only inferable by joining bookings.status, bookings.payout_released, payment_transactions.status, and refunds, with no single answer to "how much do we owe nurses right now?" Three independent critiques rated this a critical gap. The fix is one append-only table.
The ledger entity is detailed in the data model: see payments, ledger & refunds.
3.1 ledger_entries — the financial source of truth
Append-only, never updated or deleted. Every money event posts balanced rows sharing a transaction_group_id (Σ debit = Σ credit). Per-nurse balances are derived by filter, never cached in a drifting wallet-balance column.
Account types:
| account_type | Meaning |
|---|---|
escrow_held | Funds received and held (over provider custody) not yet released or refunded |
platform_revenue | Balinyaar's own commission income |
nurse_payable | What the platform owes the nurse (accrued, awaiting weekly payout) |
refund_payable | Amount owed back to the customer / in-flight reversal |
bnpl_fee_expense | The BNPL provider's merchant commission — a platform expense |
nurse_clawback_receivable | Money a nurse owes back after a refund-after-payout |
3.2 The postings
Amounts are positive; direction carries the sign. The three-amount split (gross_price_irr, balinyaar_commission_irr, bnpl_commission_irr) is defined in §7.
(a) Card payment capture (inbound):
DEBIT escrow_held gross_price_irr
CREDIT platform_revenue balinyaar_commission_irr
CREDIT nurse_payable nurse_payout_amount (= gross − balinyaar_commission)
(b) BNPL settle (inbound) — identical to a card capture, plus the provider-fee leg:
DEBIT escrow_held gross_price_irr
CREDIT platform_revenue balinyaar_commission_irr
CREDIT nurse_payable nurse_payout_amount
DEBIT bnpl_fee_expense bnpl_commission_irr
CREDIT escrow_held bnpl_commission_irr (escrow reflects NET cash actually received)
Posted once, idempotently, keyed on the settling transaction. No installment-level postings — the customer's repayment schedule is SnappPay's ledger, not ours.
(c) Refund — BEFORE the nurse is paid out (clean reversal):
DEBIT platform_revenue platform_fee_refunded_irr
DEBIT nurse_payable nurse_payout_refunded_irr
CREDIT refund_payable (sum)
Clear refund_payable when the PSP / SnappPay confirms the customer cash-back. Nothing leaves Balinyaar toward the nurse — the nurse_payable accrual is simply reversed.
(d) Clawback — refund AFTER the nurse was already paid: The nurse's nurse_payable was already drained by a processed payout batch, so there is nothing left to reverse. Instead the platform books a receivable:
DEBIT nurse_clawback_receivable amount_irr (nurse_id set; nurse now owes the platform)
CREDIT refund_payable amount_irr
Recovered by netting against the nurse's next nurse_payable at batch time, or marked written_off if uncollectable. A nurse_clawbacks row carries the lifecycle (pending / recovered / written_off). This is unavoidable because Iranian payouts are real bank transfers — hard/impossible to reverse — so the right defense is gating payout on the dispute window, with clawback as the fallback.
3.2a Implementation rules confirmed in build (backend b10)
These are the exact orderings the card-capture rail was built to (see dev/contracts/domains/payments.md):
- Upsert the webhook event first, then re-verify server-side, then confirm. Every PSP callback lands in
payment_webhook_events keyed on UNIQUE(provider_code, external_event_id) before any money state changes; a duplicate replay is a no-op. Only a new, signature-valid success event proceeds — and it is re-verified against the gateway (amount + reference) before the capture posts. A callback with an invalid signature is stored ignored and mutates nothing (never trust a callback alone).
- A unique-violation on confirm is an idempotent no-op success, not an error. The filtered
UNIQUE(booking_id) WHERE status='succeeded' is the authoritative anti-double-capture backstop: if a concurrent confirm races past the Redis lock, the second one fails the constraint and is treated as "already captured → success".
- **Payment is initiated against the accepted request, not a booking.** Because a
bookingsrow exists only
on capture, payment_transactions.booking_id is nullable and bound at confirm (when the booking is created/loaded). The captured gross is the request's frozen amount (variant price × session count).
3.3 Why the ledger, not more columns
A marketplace that holds escrow, pays out weekly minus commission, and handles refunds + clawbacks has exactly the shape double-entry was invented for. The MVP cost is one table + posting discipline. The alternative (more money columns on bookings/payouts) cannot answer "how much is held but unreleased" without fragile joins and makes bank/Shaparak reconciliation nearly impossible. Keep the per-booking fee snapshot as the pricing record; the ledger is the financial-truth / reconciliation layer posted alongside.
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