cleanup phase 7

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hamid
2026-08-02 18:58:46 +03:30
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What must pass before work is done, and what the repo refuses to let you commit.
> Last verified: 2026-07-30 against commit `d3ec723`.
> Last verified: 2026-08-02 against commit `51e86a1`.
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@@ -63,40 +63,15 @@ A change that doesn't pass its own gate is **not done**, regardless of how compl
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## 3. The pre-commit secret scan
## 3. No pre-commit secret scan (for now)
Repo-managed hooks live in `.githooks/` (in version control, unlike `.git/hooks`). **Enable them once per
clone:**
```bash
git config core.hooksPath .githooks
```
`pre-commit` is a fast, dependency-free backstop against a credential leaking into a file that shouldn't
hold one. It scans **only staged additions**, so it is quick. It rejects a commit that stages:
- the retired hardcoded admin password `qw123321`, anywhere;
- private-key material or an AWS access-key id, anywhere;
- the deployment's SQL Server host `87.107.152.16` **outside the declared config files**;
- a **real** connection-string password in any `appsettings*.json` **outside the declared config files**
(elsewhere only the `SET_VIA_USER_SECRETS_OR_ENV` placeholder is allowed).
### The declared-config allow-list
The pre-launch demo deployment configures itself from committed files rather than a secret store (see
[`DEPLOY.md`](../../../DEPLOY.md)), so a short allow-list is exempt from the last two checks:
`appsettings.Development.json` · `docker-compose.yml` · `telegram-otp-bot/.env.example` · `DEPLOY.md`
It is maintained in the `declared_config` function in the hook, and it is **the honest record of where
this repo's secrets are**. **Shrink it, never grow it.** Once real users exist, those values must be
rotated and moved out of git.
### Limits
This is the local first line of defence, **not** a replacement for a full scanner (gitleaks, trufflehog)
in CI. Bypass a false positive with `git commit --no-verify` — sparingly, and only when you are certain
the flagged line is not a secret.
There is no git hook enforcing anything in this repo — `.githooks/` was removed in phase 7 as an
MVP-stage call: this is a pre-launch demo project and the mechanical backstop wasn't worth the overhead
yet. The underlying rule is unchanged — **never commit a real secret** — it's just unenforced by tooling.
Root [CLAUDE.md](../../../CLAUDE.md) §6 already documents the repo's actual trade: config lives in
committed files, including live credentials, until real users exist (see
[DEPLOY.md](../../../DEPLOY.md) "Going to Production" for the rotation step that unblocks that). Revisit
adding a hook — or a CI scanner (gitleaks, trufflehog) — if that trade changes before this one does.
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